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Abstract:
This paper analyzes how opportunistic governments choose between alternative fiscal policies
in order to increases their chances of re-election. To increase the provision of public goods
shortly before elections – and thus, to generate a fiscal political business cycles –
governments may either increase deficits or redistribute governmental resources from long-
term efficient sources to short-term efficient public programs. We argue that incumbents who
face highly competed elections principally have an incentive to spend more on public goods
even though these investments are not efficient in the long term. In principal, they would do
so by increasing the deficits (with re-balancing the budget after the election). However, our
model demonstrates that incumbents would even electioneer at the cost of long-term
investments if the extent of fiscal transparency does not allow them to finance the provision of
public goods with higher deficits. In other words, if elections are close and voters may
observe the governmental deficit, then governments tend to increase the provision of public
goods – and consequently, their electoral prospects – by a redistribution of budget resources
from long-term efficient investment to a short-term provision of public goods. We test the
predictions with new data on the composition of government consumption for 17 OECD
countries over 35 years. The preliminary findings suggest that governments indeed reshuffle
resources from long-term efficient investment to short-term public goods before elections
especially if elections are contested.
________________________________
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2Introduction
Everything else being equal, politicians prefer winning elections to losing them. For this very
reason, candidates and parties would implement policies that improve their political support in
the short run even at the expense of long term costs. The easiest way to improve electoral
chances is by using monetary policy or deficit spending to create a political business cycle –
that is: a short economic boom before election, which after the election generates economic
costs such as higher inflation. Everything else being equal, voters prefer not to be fooled.
They tend to support political candidates who promise to implement political institutions
which prevent the government from manipulating the economy for electoral purposes.
Increasing central bank independence, fixing the exchange rate to a monetary anchor within
relatively narrow bands, and institutions which improve fiscal transparency all serve to
impede governments from creating a political business cycle.
We contend that these reforms leave governments with one policy instrument which can
under certain conditions create political cycles: the restructuring of the budget, an instrument
that we refer to as budgeteering. Strategic budgeteering occurs when governments shift
resources from budget items which are efficient in the long run to budget items which
improve political support in the short run. Strategic budgeteering is a policy instrument of last
resort: it is politically attractive, but it is less attractive than the misuse of monetary policy or
deficit spending. Our main argument holds that strategic budgeteering is more likely when the
incumbent cannot use monetary policy and when fiscal transparency is high so that deficit
spending becomes politically costly.
We derive these results in a two-period model in which incumbents have two policy options:
deficit spending and budgeteering from public investment to public good provision. We
assume that public investment is efficient only in the long run. Investment leads to economic
growth which improves voters’ private consumption in the second period. The provision of
public goods, however, directly enters the voters’ utility in the first, the pre-election period.
3Governments have an incentive to improve the provision of public goods the more, the closer
they get to an election. If incumbents decide to run deficit to provide more public goods,
voters will increase their political support for the incumbent because of the improvements in
public good provision. At the same time, they will however reduce their support for the
incumbent because expected consumption in the second period enters the utility calculation of
the voters and voters adjust this expectation when incumbents reduce public investment.
However, whether voters can observe the government’s deficit spending immediately or only
with a delay depends on the transparency of fiscal institutions. Accordingly, if fiscal
transparency is high, then governments abstain from deficit spending. In this setting, strategic
budgeteering is the only instrument to increase political support before elections.
Our theoretical model draws heavily on the research on political business cycles in fiscal
policies in order to develop an integrated fiscal theory of strategic electioneering. Departing
from these insights, we do not only show which instruments governments can use to increase
their chances of re-election and the conditions under which these instruments are effective.
Most importantly, we shed light on how governments choose between alternative fiscal
instruments in the pre-election period. Contrary to claims that political cycles in fiscal policies
do not exist under certain conditions, we show that incumbents always provide more public
goods before elections, but the way they finance these varies. The more intransparent public
budgets are, the larger the share of pre-electoral overinvestment in public goods which is
financed by deficits; the more transparent public budgets are, the larger the share of pre-
electoral overinvestment in public goods which is financed by strategic budgeteering.
When Do Monetary and Fiscal Political Business Cycles Occur?
Low or declining unemployment rates, sufficiently high economic growth rates and inflation
rates at bay are usually preferred to more stormy weathers. Clearly, these bullish economic
conditions promise rising wages and increasing purchasing power. Voters like positive
4expectations. Support for the incumbent government thus tends to co-vary with changes in the
standards of living. Governing parties thus have a significantly higher chance for winning
elections during boom cycles.
This simple logic provides incumbents with ample incentives to stimulate the economy
shortly before elections even at the expense of the long-term detrimental effect. If
governments act purely opportunistic and if either voters’ memory does not last forever or
voters consider current conditions more than previous conditions (Wright 1974, Tufte 1978,
Frey and Schneider 1978a,b, Golden and Poterba 1980, Schultz 1995, Price 1998), then the
incumbent is tempted to use all available policy instruments to create a business cycle hike
before elections at the cost of worsening economic conditions shortly after the elections.1
This section reviews the main theoretical arguments about the political business cycle and
broadly distinguishes between monetary and fiscal explanations. We argue that both types of
explanations are convincing if (but only if) certain institutional conditions apply. Therefore, a
richer understanding of political business cycles requires that scholars analyze the choice of
monetary and fiscal policy instruments in conjunction and take the specific constraints
governments face fully and simultaneously into account. We thus discuss the literature with a
focus on the conditions under which the choice of a particular instrument is more likely. In the
theoretical section, we will then more fully explore the interrelatedness of the choice of
different fiscal instruments when governments are (partly) opportunistic.
Monetary Policy and the Political Business Cycle
Early works on the political business cycle were largely motivated by NAIRU-augmented
version of the ‘Philips curve’. Philips (1958) suggested that when unemployment is high
inflation is low and vice versa. He thought of this relation as menu of choice: governments
may use lax monetary policies to raise employment at the expense of additional inflation. The
NAIRU (non-accelerating inflationary rate of unemployment) revolution argued that a
1 This idea can be traced back at least to Schumpeter (1939), Kalecki (1943), Nordhaus (1975), Hibbs (1977,
1978) and Tufte (1978).
5‘choice’ exists only in the short run. In the longer run, however, unemployment returns to its
‘natural rate’ while inflation stays higher then before the period of monetary stimulation.
Apparently, the NAIRU-augmented version of the Philips curve idea does not allow
governments to determine the average unemployment rate. It, however, allows government to
manipulate the business cycle because short term reductions in the unemployment rate are
possible.
This literature also suffered from the shared assumption that voters’ expectations are not fully
rational. Rational voters should expect that governments manipulate the economy. They
therefore adjust their inflation expectations when governments change their monetary policy
and not just when higher inflation rates become measurable and will be publicly discussed.
Subsequent explanations of the political business cycle thus replaced the assumption of
adaptive, retrospective voters and assumed forward-looking voters with rational expectations
(Alesina 1987, 1988; Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Persson and Tabellini 1990). Forward-looking
individuals vote for candidates who are most competent in handling the economy. Under this
assumption, governments may still manipulate the business cycle, but rather than doing so to
fool the voters they do so to signal their competence. The government in these models
engages in some sort of brinkmanship: by willingly worsening the budget situation they create
a situation which can only be handled by a competent government. Since the voters prefer
ceteris paribus competent to incompetent governments, but cannot observe the candidates’
skills independently of their actions in a crisis situation, the government’s behavior is rational
and helps winning elections.
Yet, all these models of monetary policy induced political business cycles depend on the
crucial assumption that governments indeed command over monetary policy. The rapid
increase in central bank independence on the one hand and European monetary integration on
the other hand made explanations of the business cycle which were exclusively based on
monetary policy less and less convincing over the last decades. Why should independent
6central bankers help the government signaling its competence? Why do voters believe that the
government is competent if the independent central bank solves macroeconomic tensions by
choosing an optimal monetary policy?
Fiscal Policies and the Political Business Cycle
The monetary policy version of the political business cycle literature was complemented by a
fiscal sibling. Again, this literature comes in two variants. The first variant explains political
business cycles by pre-election deficit spending of the government. The second argues that
governments reshuffle financial resources away from spending which is efficient in the long
run into budgets which attract votes in the short run.
Both versions are based on the premise of rational and forward-looking voter. Voters prefer
candidates who are able to provide more public goods for given levels of taxation and private
consumption (e.g. Rogoff and Sibert 1988; Rogoff 1990; Shi and Svensson 2002; Alt and
Lassen 2006a, b). The difference between the two versions is the amount of information
voters have. In the literature on cycles in deficit spending voters are not informed about the
candidates’ ability to handle the economy (e.g. Shi and Svensson 2002; Persson and Tabellini
2002). Additionally, they do not observe the current levels of debt. Governments thus try to
appear competent by temporarily raising economic growth or improving the welfare of large
numbers of citizens before an election by providing more public goods.2 They are thereby
tempted to finance these policies with higher deficits because voters cannot observe (and thus
would not punish) such a strategy even if it is distorting in the long-run.
Incomplete information puts an important restriction to those models: Cycles in deficits only
exist if voters are not able to observe changes in budget deficits. Empirical research shows
that voters reduce support if they observe governments to increase deficits before elections.3
The argument that governments ‘signal competence’ remains unconvincing in this case, since
2 Partisan theories to political business cycles argue that parties have different affinities for example to
increase spending on different policy fields (Hibbs 1977; Alesina 1989; Cusack 1997; Boix 2000).
3 E.g. Alesina, Perotti and Tavares 1998; Brender 2003; Brender and Drazen 2005; Drazen and Eslava 2005;
Peltzman 1992; Schneider 2007.
7no competence is needed to run deficits. Indeed, a competent government would provide
benefits to voters without increasing deficits. (Drazen 2000b: 101). In other words, if voters
observe fiscal policy then they will punish the incumbent during elections. The amount of
information the voter receives about the incumbent’s actions in democratic countries depends
on the transparency of fiscal institutions within a country (Alt and Lassen 2006a, b; Shi and
Svensson 2006).4 “Where institutions are less transparent, the cycle in fiscal balance appears,
while we find no such electorally related movements in higher-transparency countries” (Alt
and Lassen 2006a: 530).5
However, incumbents are not restricted to use higher deficits in order to attract additional
votes. Electoral manipulation in democratic countries could easily take the form of cycles in
the composition of public spending. Specifically, governments face a trade off when voters
who dislike high government expenditure and deficits observe fiscal policy. On one hand,
they aim to achieve a balanced budget before elections to demonstrate their economic
competence. On the other hand, they have an incentive to provide more public goods in order
to gain political support. Since voters value some public goods more than others, governments
could easily increase spending on these items – which Brender and Drazen (2005) call
targeted spending – while, at the same time, they decrease non-targeted spending, thus
allowing the overall level of spending – and therefore also the deficit – to remain unchanged
(Drazen and Eslava 2005, 2006).
Discussion
“Both rational- and adaptive-expectations political-cycle studies typically underemphasized
crucial variation in the “(a) international and domestic, (b) political-economic, and (c)
4 Others argue that macro-political budget cycles are restricted to weak and/or new democracies because in
those countries voters are less able to monitor and evaluate the fiscal policy process (e.g., Akhmedov and
Zhuravskaya 2004; Hallerberg, de Souza and Clark 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2002b, 2003; Shi and
Svensson 2000, 2002, 2006; Brender and Drazen 2005).
5 Milesi-Feretti (2004) and Rose (2006) examine the impact of fiscal rules on the scope for political business
cycles in fiscal policies. Ferejohn (1999) shows that state-enforced media reinforces the effect of low
transparency.
8institutional, structural, and strategic contexts in which elected, partisan incumbents make
policy. (…) The magnitude, regularity, and content of electoral and partisan cycles will vary
with the contexts reflected in differing combinations of conditions (a), (b), and (c)” (Franzese
2002a: 370). Recently, scholars have addressed these problems by analyzing the conditions
and the context under which cycles in monetary and fiscal policies are possible. Alt and
Lassen, for example, have developed a model that explains under which conditions
incumbents can increase deficits to increase political support in the pre-electoral period
(Alt/Lassen 2006a, b). However, monetary and fiscal instruments have been analyzed largely
in isolation and without sufficiently unifying the different conditions under which
opportunistic political strategies emerge and evolve. Unrestricted governments command over
monetary and fiscal policies and may use both policies either simultaneously or
complimentary. If governments lack monetary policy autonomy, the use of fiscal instruments
opportunistically becomes more likely. At the same time, fiscal political cycles can be caused
either by deficit spending or by ‘opportunistic strategic budgeteering’.
Institutionally constraint governments lack full control over at least one of these instruments.
However, this does not imply that electoral engineering becomes impossible. Indeed,
governments may always find a way to opportunistically attract voters unless monetary policy
is fully controlled by an independent central bank, changes in budget deficits are immediately
observed by voters, and opportunistic budgeteering is impossible. It is not very likely that
these three conditions apply simultaneously.
Figure 1 gives account of the unified theory of the political business cycle taking into account
the various insights from the literature.6 The figure simplifies since all determinants of the
governments choices (blue) should be treated as continuum rather than as dichotomy. As a
result, our model does not predict that governments face a either-or choice. Rather, the
6 We are not the first to suggest a unified model of the political business cycle, see Clark and Hallerberg 2000.
Flexible exchange rates limit the effectiveness of fiscal policies and thereby the scope of incumbents to
increase political support via deficit spending. Central Bank Independence (CBI) and the European
Monetary Union (EMU) may also have effects on the existence and scope of electoral cycles.
9options are complementary and partly rivalry, but not mutually exclusive. In the next section,
we discuss a formal a model that shows exactly this for fiscal strategies in the pre-election
period.7
central bank independence
highlow
exchange rate peg
no yes
low high
'fear of floating'
monetary policy deficit spending strategic budgeteering
fiscal transparency
highlow
We take the different fiscal strategies which where discussed in the literature into account and
analyze them in an integrated theoretical framework. Consequentially, we can derive the
conditions under which we should either see no pre-electoral manipulation of fiscal policies,
deficit spending, or shifts in the composition of spending. Most importantly, our model finds
that incumbents principally have an incentive to spend more on public goods if elections are
7 The baseline model focuses on the choice between fiscal instruments. We will extent this model to incorporate
monetary policies as well.
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close even though these short-term investments are not efficient in the long term. And while
they would do so by increasing the deficits (with re-balancing the budget after the election),
they would even choose this strategy at the cost of long-term investments if the extent of
fiscal transparency does not allow them to finance the provision of public goods with higher
deficits. In other words, if elections are close and the governmental deficit is visible to voters,
then governments tend to increase the provision of public goods – and consequently, their
electoral prospects – by a redistribution of budget resources from long-term efficient
investment to a short-term provision of public goods. The next section formalizes this
intuition and provides a theoretical argument of strategic budgeteering.
Political Cycles and Strategic Budgeteering
Elections are costly. Not only for the losing party, but also for the incumbent who aims to
provide more public goods in order to increase her chances to get re-elected. To improve the
welfare of the electorate in the short-term she may choose between alternative fiscal
strategies. Our model of strategic budgeteering is based on existing models of political
business cycles in fiscal policies. Specifically, we draw from Alt and Lassen (2006a,b) and
Drazen/Eslava (2005, 2006) who analyze different fiscal strategies (and their constraints) to
increase public good provision before elections. From these insights, we develop an integrated
formal theory of fiscal instruments in the pre-election period. Specifically, we assume that
governments may pursue three alternative strategies. In order to increase the provision of
public goods they can (a) abstain from pursuing opportunistic policies in the pre-electoral
period, (b) increase deficit spending, and (c) redistribute spending from long-term efficient
investments to the short-term provision of public goods.8
8 We distinguish between longterm and shortterm spending unlike Drazen and Eslava (2005) who separate
targeted from non-targeted spending. We concur that this is a useful distinction but argue that both targeted
and non-targeted spending are part of short-term public good provision before elections. We will extend the
model in the future to allow for this distinction as well.
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In order to understand the conditions under which governments choose one or the other
alternative, we develop a standard political economy model in which opportunistic
governments choose between these fiscal strategies in order to maximize their chances to get
re-elected by rational and prospective voters (e.g. Romer 2001, Persson and Tabellini 2002).9
Voters care about their expected well-being in the future and make their electoral choices
based on their expected income in the time after the elections. Consequently, we have to
compare the long-term implications of the alternative fiscal choices and consider a two period
model where elections take place at the end of period 1.
In our baseline model, we simply assume that opportunistic governments try to maximize the
utility of a representative voter over the two periods.10 In the following, we thus first derive a
voter utility function and then derive the government’s optimal fiscal strategies before
elections.
Fiscal Policies and Voter Welfare
Voters gain utility from two sources. They may gain from private consumption, C, (as a result
of higher private income) and from publicly provided goods, G.11 Thus, the voter’s income is
defined by
Y C G  (1)
For simplicity, and without any loss of generalizability, we define income in the first period to
equal exactly 1, 1ty  .
12
9 Our baseline model assumes a closed economy but extensions to the baseline model that allow for influences of
capital mobility and exchange-rate policy are in principle possible and desirable.
10 Further extensions to the baseline model will include policy makers with ideological preferences. Introducing
ideology will allow for targeted partisan, sectoral and regional budgeteering.
11 Since voters are only interested in consumption, we disregard all possibilities of private investment and
saving. Adding these features to the model is possible but would not change the main conclusions.
12 Alternatively, we may define a neoclassical or endogenous production function, 1tY AK L
  , where Y is the Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), A is Productivity, K is Capital, and L denotes Labor. This solution would be more elegant but it is
much less parsimonious and does not provide additional information for our model.
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In the first period, government spending (Gt) is financed by a fixed lump-sum tax rate .
Alternatively, incumbents can increase public spending by creating a deficit (Dt) in period 1.
Hence, the budget constraint is given by
t t tG Y D  , (2)
and for private consumption it directly follows that
 1t tC Y  . (3)
Equation (3) shows that the voters’ welfare declines in period 1 if the incumbent raises taxes
to pursue expansionary fiscal policies in the period before elections. Consequently,
incumbents are usually attracted to increase deficits in the pre-election period if possible
because an increase in taxes in period 1 would result in declining political support during
elections. Despite the relative attractiveness of deficits, we assume that the government has to
balance the budget over the two periods. If governments decide to use deficit spending for
public good provision in period 1, they have to increase revenues in the second period in order
to balance the budget. Thus,
1 1 0t t t tD D D D      , (4)
where Dt denotes the budget deficit in period 1 and Dt+1 is the budget deficit in period 2.
So far (and in line with most of the literature cited above), we simply assumed that
governments have an incentive to increase spending before elections and that they either
increase deficits or taxes to do so. However, we have not taken into account that incumbents
typically have a choice between different spending items. Public budgets are divided into
many different budget items (such as defense, social security, education, etc.) and
governments may choose to increase or decrease spending on either of them. In the following,
we thus assume that governments may principally raise expenditures on two different types of
13
public goods – long-term efficient investment (Lt) and/or short-term efficient public goods
(Pt):
t t tG L P  . (5)
On one hand, they may increase long-term efficient investment (Lt). This does not have a
direct positive effect in period 1 but it increases future (post-election) income by a growth
parameter  :
1t t tY Y L   (6)
Consequently, real private consumption also increases in the period after the election by long-
term efficient government consumption. On the other hand, incumbents can increase
expenditure on inefficient short-term public good provision ( tP ) which is purely consumptive
and only has an effect in period 1. Examples of such short-term policies are labor market
programs, social security spending, or other social transfer payments. However, although
long-term investments have a positive effect in the second period, only the provision of short-
term public goods has an immediate effect before the election. In other words, voters generate
utility in period 1 only from private consumption and short-term public goods, but not from
public investment that generates growth in the long-run:
it t tU C P  (7)
From this follows that governments can increase the voters’ welfare directly before elections
by providing more short-term efficient public goods in period 1. They have a strong incentive
to do so since this increases their probability of being re-elected.
In her incentive to increase transfer payments before elections, however, the incumbent is
restricted by her budget constraint. For example, the incumbent can increase the deficit to
provide more public goods. Yet, the government budget has to be balanced over the two
14
periods, and thus, the deficit incurred in period 1 has to be paid back fully in period 2 plus an
interest of size r (r>0). This has important implications for future consumption:
   1 1 1t t t tC Y L r D       (8)
If incumbents electioneer in period 1, then consumption declines in the period after elections
(period 2) because the government has to increase revenues in order to re-balance the budget.
Given those negative effects, we assume that governments only create deficits in order to
finance short-term public goods that help to increase the probability of re-election.
The diverging long-term effects of the two different policies – long versus short term
spending – create a new opportunity for the government. Even if incumbents could not rely on
deficit spending in period 1 for whatever reason, they may reduce long-term efficient
investment (Lt) in order to provide more public goods (Pt). In other words, allowing for
different types of goods creates an environment in which incumbents may choose between
three policy instruments to increase their chances of re-election: they can either (a) do
nothing, (b) increase deficit spending (Dt) in order to provide more public goods (Pt) in period
1, or (c) increase short-term provision of public goods (Pt) by redistributing resources from
long-term efficient investments (Lt).13
Rational, prospective voters aim to take this into account when calculating their utility (ui)
before elections. Most importantly, their utility from voting for the incumbent depends on
their utility in period 1 (which is just the sum of private consumption and public goods) and
the expected utility in period 2. While they can directly observe utility in period 1,
consumption in period 2 is discounted by a factor  , 10   , and not fully anticipated by
voters, but only expected:
 1 1it ,t t t tU C P C     , (9)
13 Recall, they could also raise taxes. As discussed above, however, governments are less attracted to this fiscal
policy instrument since voters observe a direct decline in their welfare and would punish the incumbent during
elections.
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where E stands for the expectation term. We take the logarithm of the contemporary and
future consumption. This ensures a positive but decreasing utility function without generating
a loss of generality (see Romer 2001, pp. 177-78). Accordingly, equation (9) simply turns into
    1 1it ,t t t tU ln C P ln C     . (10)
Whether expected consumption in period 2 approaches actual consumption in period 1
depends on two factors. First, voters expect a higher future well-being the higher the growth
rate  (0< <1) which determines the effect of long-term government investment on future
consumption.
At the same time, they expect lower future well-being the higher the public deficit incurred by
the government in period 1. However, voters cannot always observe distortive policies of the
government. How well voters can observe debt-creation by the government depends on how
transparent the fiscal system is (e.g. Alt/Lassen 2006a, b).14 Fiscal transparency is defined as
“public openness about the structure and functions of government, fiscal policy intentions,
public sector accounts, and projections. It involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive,
timely, understandable, and internationally comparable information on government activities
(…) so that the electorate and financial markets can accurately assess the government’s
financial position and the true costs and benefits of government activities, including their
present and future economic and social implications” (Kopits and Craig 1998, 1).
In other words, fiscal transparency determines the visibility of debt-creation by the
government and indicates the need to re-balance the budget in the period after elections. If
deficit-creation is perfectly visible, voters know that the full amount of deficit generated in the
first period must be compensated for in the second period and fully decreases consumption in
14 Note, since we assume that our incumbents are elected, we do not need to take into account the quality of
democratic institutions to measure the visibility of governmental fiscal policies (e.g. Shi and Svensson 2000,
2002, 2006). However, both – fiscal transparency and democratic quality – have the same notion as they
measure the extent to which governmental debt-creation is visible.
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the second period. If deficit spending is not observable, then governments can use deficits to
finance short-term public goods since this does not enter voters' utility calculation.
Note, fiscal transparency mainly has an impact on whether voters can observe deficit
spending by the government. Accordingly, fiscal transparency has a larger impact on the
relationship between deficit spending and the voters’ expected welfare in the second period
than on the relationship between strategic budgeteering and voter welfare. This assumption
finds support in the fact that e.g. the media and opposition parties mainly use deficit-creation
of the incumbent government to point out her incompetence in the political competition.
Empirical research shows that voters perceive large deficits as signal that the economy is not
doing well and tend to punish the incumbent for bad economic policy outcomes (see FN 3).
The same pattern has not been observed for incumbents who increase short-term transfers in
the year before elections. Finally note, however, that the voters’ utility at least implicitly
decreases if governments refer to strategic budgeteering because this decreases the expected
consumption in period 2.
Both factors, the growth rate ( ) and fiscal transparency ( , 0 1  ) have an important
effect on the voter’s expected utility from voting for the incumbent government. Including
them, the expected consumption in period 2 is
   1 1 1t t t tE C Y L ( r )D        . (11)
Over two periods, a representative individual then maximizes expected utility such that
     1 1 1 1t ,t t t t t tmaxu ln Y P ln Y L ( r )D             . (12)
Recall, above we assumed that the government faces two budget constraints. On one hand the
policy maker can use tax revenue to finance both long-term efficient and short-term
inefficient public goods. On the other hand governments also can create deficits to provide
short-term public goods before elections. However, since the budget must be balanced over
the two periods, it doesn't make sense for the government to use deficit spending on long-term
17
investment. Introducing fiscal transparency changes the incentives for governments to create
deficits as well:
t t tY L P   (13)
 1t tD P  (14)
The two budget constraints show that inefficient public goods (Pt) which only serve
opportunistic goals are mainly financed by deficits if transparency is low (e.g., if 0 ). If
transparency is high (e.g., if 1 ), only tax revenue can be used to provide these types of
public goods. Alternatively, governments can decrease spending in long-term efficient
policies in order to increase short-term provision of public goods (see equation 13). As above,
we can assume that governments are more likely attracted to the latter since taxes cause a
direct decline in the voters’ welfare before elections.
Optimal Fiscal Strategies in the Pre-election Period
The incumbent (who maximizes voter support) has to maximize the aggregated utility of
individuals under its own budget constraints. We assume, however, that governments have a
higher incentive to invest in inefficient short-term public goods if elections are much
contested and the ex ante – perceived by the incumbent – probability to win the election is
relatively low. The Lagrangian then is:
       
    
1 1 1 1
1
t t t t t
t t t t t
ln Y P ln Y L ( r )D
Y L P D P
     
    
        
     
L
, (15)
where  measures the ex-ante probability of winning the election (0< <1).  and  are the
Lagrange multipliers and describe the budget constraints under which the government has to
maximize voter utility over the two periods.
From the above equations we can derive the first order conditions for optimal deficit
spending, long-term government investment and short-term public good provision.
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To solve this system of equations, we can use the partial derivations for the budget constraints
 and  :
 1 0t tD P


   

L (19)
0t t tY L P 


   

L (20)
Successively solving the above equations gives us the optimal deficit spending ( opttD ), short-
term public good provision ( opttP ) and long-term government investment (
opt
tL ) dependent
only on the theoretically interesting parameters:
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These equations for optimal policy choices of deficit, short-term public good provision and
long-term government investment do note only show the conditions under which each single
strategy is optimal but also indicate how governments choose between alternative fiscal
instruments.15
Predictions of the Model and Extensions
We can derive several important predictions from the theoretical model. Most importantly,
opportunistic governments have an incentive to increase the voters’ welfare before elections
in order to maximize their chances to get re-elected. In doing so, they aim to increase the
short-term provision of public goods particularly if elections are close. These policies come at
a prize, however. Incumbents need to increase the budget deficits before elections if they want
to expand public expenditures to gain political support. However, fiscally conservative voters
punish distortive policies and would withdraw their political support if deficits are visible.
The model then predicts that deficit spending declines with higher fiscal transparency and
higher interest rates. Fiscal transparency constrains the government’s ability to manipulate the
electoral business cycle.
Yet, incumbents still aim to electioneer – especially if the elections are close. The declining
opportunity to use deficit spending thus increases the government’s incentive to refer to other
strategies such as a redistribution of government resources from long-term efficient
investments towards short-term efficient public goods. Even though higher fiscal transparency
also reduces the ability of policy makers to shift large parts of the budget from long term
efficient investment to short term beneficial public goods, governments do so especially if
elections are close. Along these lines, the model predicts that long-term investment declines if
the probability of re-election is small and fiscal institutions are transparent (but at a lower rate
the higher fiscal transparency). At the same time, short-term public good provision also
declines with transparency, but at a much lower rate than long-term investment.
15 Since it is hard to interpret equation 23, in an earlier paper we simulate the comparative statics of the model
and give a detailed derivation of the model predictions.
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In other words, the instrument of deficit spending seems to be the most valuable for
governments if fiscal transparency is low as it allows the government to finance additional
public goods without decreasing long-term efficient investments. Fiscal transparency reduces
the incumbent’s incentive to pursue distortive policies. However, while she cannot provide as
many public goods as in the case of fiscal non-transparency, the incumbent can redirect some
budget resources from long-term efficient investments away to short-term beneficial projects.
Note, however, that this is less likely the more transparent the fiscal institutions. Thus,
increases in public goods are always higher when fiscal transparency is low.
Empirical Investigation of Strategic Budgeteering
In the following we attempt to put the predictions of the theoretical model to the test. We use
new data on the composition of public expenditure for 17 OECD countries over 35 years.16
The data provides information on 23 spending categories ranging from expenditure for
defense, public order and safety to education, social security and welfare, agriculture, mining
and manufacturing, as well as infrastructure such as roads and railways. Table 1 describes all
items in more detail. We employ both total expenditure and relative expenditure per item as
the dependent variable.
In order to test the hypothesis on strategic reshuffling from long-term efficient to short-term
beneficial public spending in pre-election periods, we have to decide which items rather
constitute long-term efficient and which short-term strategic public goods. The last column of
table 1 shows our allocation which relies heavily on the categorization provided by Drazen
and Eslava (2005) and we also consider work on German partisan spending preferences
(Bawn 1999, Koenig / Troeger 2005). We only allocated the most obvious items and exclude
the residual category from the empirical analysis. Drazen and Eslava (2005) mostly
16 The 17 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, france, Germany, Iceland (not
for all models), Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the US.
The data collection was funded by the German Science Foundation (DFG).
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distinguish spending items with respect to targeted and non-targeted spending. We argue that
both targeted (e.g. sectoral, regional) spending and non-targeted spending, especially social
security transfers can be used in the short term to manipulate electoral behavior. We therefore
find it more plausible to distinguish long-term efficient investment from short-term inefficient
public good provision either to the median voter or targeted groups. Admittedly the
assignment of items to a long-term and a short-term category is still pretty ad hoc and needs
more theoretical derivation. Yet, for a first empirical investigation this allocation seems to
provide us with relatively robust and consistent results. The assignment of items to long-term
efficient and short-term beneficial public spending allows testing the first prediction on
strategic budgeteering that incumbents tend to reshuffle resources from efficient investment to
inefficient public good provision before elections in order to increase their chances staying in
office. To determine the pre-election period we simply generate a dummy that takes the value
one for the 24 month prior to a legislative election and zero otherwise. The data comes from
the Database of Political Institutions (DPI) of the World Bank (Keefer 2004).17
Table 1: Composition of Government Spending
17 We experimented with one pre-election year with no substantive changes to the main estimation results. For a
better operationalization of the pre-electoral period and a more detailed discussion see Franzese (2002, 2003)
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Expenditure
Item
Description Longterm/ shortterm
1 General Public Services
2 Defense Longterm
3 Public Order & Safety Longterm
4 Education Longterm
5 Health Longterm
6 Social Security & Welfare Shortterm / non-targeted
7 Housing & Community Amenities Shortterm
8 Recreational, Cultural & Religious Affairs
9 Fuel & Energy Shortterm/ Targeted
10 Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing & Hunting Shortterm/ Targeted
11 Mining, Manufacturing & Construction Shortterm/ Targeted
12 Transportation & Communication Shortterm/ Targeted
13 Other Economic Affairs & Services
14 Other Expenditures
15 of which: Interest Payments
16 Adjustment to Total Expenditure
17 Economic Affairs & Social Services (9-13) (only if 9-13 not
available)
Shortterm
18 Environmental Protection Longterm
19 Electricity, Steam, Water
20 Roads Shortterm
21 Inland & Coastal Waterways
22 Other Transport & Communication Shortterm
23 Other Economic Services
The theoretical model also predicts that strategic reshuffling of resources depends on the
fiscal transparency of the country and the ex ante probability of winning an election (the
closeness of the electoral competition). We operationalize the first condition by using the
fiscal transparency index provided by Alt and Lassen (2005) which is based on a 1999 OECD
questionnaire sent to all Budget Directors of OECD member countries. The main problem of
the variable consists in its time invariance. Thus this argument only can be tested in a purely
cross-sectional manner.18 Basically, we argue that in more fiscally transparent countries,
incumbents cannot easily use deficits to provide public goods before elections but have to
reshuffle the budget from long-term efficient to short-term beneficial spending. Thus, high
transparency should make strategic budgeteering more likely. The second condition –
closeness of elections – states that governments only resort to heavy budgeteering if the
18 However, this measure comes closest to our theoretical definition of fiscal transparency. For future research,
alternative measures for transparency have to be constructed. Since we use country dummies in all our models,
we use interaction effects with long- and short-term items as well as election periods to identify the effect of
transparency.
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elections are highly contested. To capture this factor we use a variable provided by the DPI
(2004) which measures the margin of the majority by dividing the number of seats won by the
largest government party by the total number of seats (government plus opposition plus non-
aligned). Thus the larger value of the variable the less contested the elections are. Of course,
this operationalization cannot capture situations of unexpected landslide victories but comes
very close to our theoretical definition.19
We conduct the empirical analysis in two steps. First we run models for alternative strategies
to reshuffling the budget such as relaxing monetary policy, debt creation, and tax reduction. In
a second step we estimate the extent of strategic budgeteering depending on the two
conditions (transparency and closeness of elections) as well as controlling for alternative
strategies. We also test for partisan effects but do not exhaustively cover this question and
leave it for future research.
Electoral Business Cycles without Strategic Budgeteering
In a first stage we examine whether governments in OECD countries use strategic measures
before elections in order to increase their odds of being re-elected. We look at debt creation
(debt per GDP, OECD), monetary policy and monetary outcomes (interest rate and inflation –
both WDI), and taxation (consumption tax revenue – OECD, average effective tax rates on
capital and labor – own calculations, see Troeger 2008). We regress these instruments on the
pre-election period, transparency and their interaction. We control for the unemployment rate
and GDP per capita (both WDI), left and right cabinet portfolios (both DPI), the electoral
system (1 – majoritarian, 0 – proportional, DPI) and Checks and Balances to the executive20
(DPI). Since the theoretical model predicts an impact of interest rates on the ability of policy
19 It is always problematic to use ex post outcome data to model ex ante expectations. In future iterations of the
paper we will use survey data on pre-electoral preferences to operationalize the incumbents ex ante
expectation of winning the election.
20 We use different measures for veto players/ points, and institutional constraints to the executive with
essentially the same statistical results.
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makers to create higher deficits we include the main lending rate (OECD) to the right-hand-
side of the debt ratio equation. We also add a dummy for EMU members that adopted the
Maastricht criteria in order to test for the effect of stricter constraints to deficit spending and
debt creation for those governments.
We employ the fixed effects vector decomposition method suggested by Plümper and Troeger
(2007) since the transparency measure is time invariant and the electoral system is slow
moving at best, but certainly cross-sectionally dominant. This allows us to keep the beneficial
characteristics of the fixed effects estimator for all time varying right-hand-side variables but
still efficiently estimate coefficients for transparency and electoral system. We also employ a
Prais-Winston transformation to eliminate existing serial correlation.21 Table 2 depicts the
estimation results.
The most interesting (for our purpose) conclusion is that we cannot find any business cycle or
at least pre-electoral activity for taxation or monetary policy which corresponds to our
theoretical discussion. Only for debt creation we can observe that governments on average
increase the debt prior to elections in order to provide public goods that serve their electoral
chances. Yet, in more fiscally transparent countries, incumbents are less likely to use debt
creation for electoral purposes – the electoral business cycle becomes flatter. This finding
supports the first hypothesis of our theoretical model: incumbents in fiscally transparent
systems are less likely to use deficit spending prior to elections in order to increase their
probability of being re-elected. In addition we find that higher interest rates indeed reduce
deficit spending in general since debt services become more expensive. Also, as expected
EMU members have lower debt ratios on average.
21 We are painfully aware of all the endogeneity and simultaneity issues of this approach. It would certainly be
better to estimate a simultaneous equation model. Yet, our most important results do not change.
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Table 2: Electoral Business Cycles for Taxation, Monetary Policy and Debt Creation
Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d Model 1e Model 1f
Debt Inflation Interest
rate
Consumption
tax
Labor tax Capital
tax
Pre-election 4.901** 0.207 -0.112 28.059 -0.578 -0.419
(2.394) (0.430) (0.470) (34.833) (0.531) (0.959)
Pre*Transp. -0.695** 0.004 0.038 -4.210 0.112 0.104
(0.363) (0.108) (0.121) (6.872) (0.103) (0.209)
Transparency -0.197* -0.365*** -0.206*** 18.858*** 0.546*** 0.108
(0.121) (0.090) (0.073) (2.529) (0.032) (0.106)
Unemployment 3.757*** -0.768*** -0.211*** 0.204 0.647*** -0.085
(0.192) (0.061) (0.066) (2.626) (0.052) (0.115)
GDP per cap. 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000*** 0.026*** 0.000*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
Left cabinet 0.038** -0.012*** -0.006 -0.511 0.012* 0.008
(0.015) (0.004) (0.007) (0.400) (0.006) (0.014)
Right cabinet 0.014 -0.012*** -0.009 -0.231 0.003 0.010
(0.018) (0.004) (0.007) (0.488) (0.007) (0.010)
Checks & Bal. -1.176*** -0.042 -0.089* -11.256** -0.036 -0.126
(0.327) (0.051) (0.059) (5.612) (0.112) (0.164)
Majoritarian -19.502*** 0.766*** 0.478** 347.782*** -12.162*** 8.913***
(0.964) (0.122) (0.190) (25.752) (0.249) (0.409)
Interest Rate -0.302**
(0.128)
EMU -2.207**
(0.945)
Intercept 12.810*** 26.998*** 18.968*** -324.723*** 28.365*** 22.831***
(0.449) (0.294) (0.269) (18.732) (0.289) (0.395)
Fevd fevd fevd fevd fevd fevd
R² adj. 0.878 0.644 0.561 0.897 0.909 0.786
N 439 477 426 480 492 485
F 14595.300 707.237 42.018 184.135 1429.866 395.294
Prob. > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust White Standard Errors in Parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In the next section we analyze whether governments are in turn more likely to reshuffle the
budget for electoral purposes.
Electoral Business Cycles and Strategic Budgeteering
If governments cannot create debt, do they strategically reshuffle the budget from long-term
efficient investment to short-term beneficial public goods in order to improve their electoral
prospects? This section tries to empirically answer the question. Since our dependent variable
is a composite of different budget items, efficiency issues due to substitution effects arise. We
have yet to find a suitable way to address these issues in a satisfactory manner. However, this
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model exactly estimates possible substitution effects between long-term efficient investments
and short-term public goods because it only includes these budget items into the model. We
use dummy variables for these two categories and interact these with the most important
theoretical variables. We are aware that this approach does not account for any other
substitution effects between single spending items but we are confident that the empirical
results give us some insights into the mechanisms of strategic budgeteering. To further
address substitution issues we use both relative expenditure per item as well as total
expenditure per item (with overall spending on the RHS of the model capturing the budget
constraint) and compare the results.22 The data structure is three-dimensional: spending item
per country per year (15*17*35). Spending data are consistently available for about 13
spending categories which leaves us with about 7735 observations from which we can use
5000-6000 observations for 16-17 countries due to missing data for some of the institutional
variables especially before 1980. We use other budgeteering measures (debt, monetary policy
and taxation) and the same political and institutional variables as in the first stage models as
control variables.
We include country dummies into all models so that the level effect of transparency is soaked
up by the country effects. We still can identify the pre-electoral effect of fiscal transparency
which is sufficient for the test of our hypothesis. We again employ a Prais-Winston
transformation to control for existent serial correlation. This specification is also useful since
we are interested in short-term adjustment effects in spending.
The results presented in Table 3 test the argument that governments reshuffle resources from
long-term investment to short-term public goods before elections and whether this is
conditional on fiscal transparency. The model fit is reasonably good for total expenditure but
poor for relative expenditure which is to be expected due to the high share of pre-determined
spending. Still all models in table 3 support our prediction that governments indeed engage in
22 We also use yearly changes in spending per item with mostly the same findings, yet significance levels drop.
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strategic budgeteering before elections. Long-term efficient investment is reduced in the pre-
electoral period and more money is spent on short-term public goods, especially social
security, manufacturing and other sectoral subsidies. In addition, fiscal transparency dampens
the electoral cycle and incumbents in more transparent countries are less likely to reshuffle
the budget before elections but invest in long-term efficient projects such as infrastructure and
education. These findings are robust throughout all models in table 3. Yet, the effect is not as
strong as for deficit spending suggesting that even though fiscal transparency constrains
electioneering ceteris paribus it has a smaller impact on strategic budgeteering. The more
transparent a country the higher the probability that voters can see thru all kind of measures
whose sole purpose is to manipulate the electoral business cycle.
Table 3: Strategic Budgeteering and Transparency
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Model
2a
Model 2b Model
2c
Model 2d Model
2e
Model 2f
Relative
exp. per
item
Total exp.
per item
Relative
exp. per
item
Total exp.
per item
Relative
exp. per
item
Total exp.
per item
Total gov. exp. 0.088*** 0.091*** 0.091***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Preelection longterm
spending
-0.04*** -3369.75*** -0.02*** -3808.30*** -0.022** -2394.334*
(0.010) (933.888) (0.006) (1061.337) (0.009) (1263.005)
Pre*long*Transp. 0.004** 290.745** 0.002* 343.850** 0.002* 267.070**
(0.002) (123.602) (0.001) (139.392) (0.001) (134.216)
Preelection shortterm
spending
0.043** 5654.359** 0.057*** 6567.498** 0.048* 5304.239*
(0.017) (2454.492) (0.016) (2856.804) (0.024) (3552.546)
Pre*short*Transp. -0.003 -608.965* -0.005* -734.906** -0.004* -665.477*
(0.003) (321.497) (0.003) (373.468) (0.003) (382.674)
Pre*long*debt -0.000 -24.356
(0.000) (18.933)
Pre*short*debt 0.000 22.458
(0.000) (50.112)
Debt per GDP 0.000 14.940 0.000 15.916
(0.000) (21.620) (0.000) (22.294)
Inflation 0.000 75.165** 0.000 75.641**
(0.000) (31.427) (0.000) (31.492)
Labor tax 0.001 18.970 0.001 17.573
(0.000) (61.560) (0.000) (61.696)
Capital tax -0.000 74.479* -0.000 74.523*
(0.000) (44.694) (0.000) (44.688)
Consumption tax rev. 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.071
(0.000) (0.826) (0.000) (0.828)
Intercept 0.072*** -1378.037* 0.061*** -5440.959** 0.061*** -5429.18**
(0.004) (739.683) (0.016) (2666.214) (0.016) (2666.167)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R² adj. 0.004 0.283 0.009 0.278 0.009 0.278
N 6268 6268 5801 5801 5801 5801
F 4.106 79.183 3.073 62.387 2.949 57.754
Robust White Standard Errors in Parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In addition we check whether incumbents who are unable to use deficit spending for electoral
purposed compensate by reshuffling more money across budgetary items. Yet, the results
remain inconclusive since the estimates turn out statistically insignificant. If anything it seems
that governments who use deficit spending before elections also have a higher propensity to
engage in strategic budgeteering which would support the results found with respect to
transparency.
Most of the control variables do not exert a significant effect on overall spending, just
inflation and capital taxation lead to higher expenditure on all spending items.
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The models in table 4 test for the second condition – the closeness of election as well as some
partisan budgeteering. We interact pre-electoral long- and short-term spending with the
margin of the majority and expect that the smaller the margin the higher the propensity for
redirecting resources from long-term investment to short-term electoral gifts. And we find
exactly this: the more contested the elections the more money is reshuffled. The larger the
margin the smaller the need for the incumbent to engage in strategic budgeteering and thus the
positive sign for long-term spending and negative coefficient estimates for short-term
expenditure. The signs are consistent throughout all models but the coefficients only turn out
to be significant for the effect on long-term spending. The findings for pre-electoral
reshuffling and transparency remain stable throughout all models.
Finally, we test some partisan hypotheses. Based on predictions by Bawn (1999) and Koenig
and Troeger (2005) we chose the most obvious partisan items for right-wing and left-wing
parties – military (defense) spending and social security & welfare spending. We also
examine whether governments increase social security spending before elections in case the
economy does badly – the unemployment rate is high. The results are shown in the bottom
right corner of table 4 (Model 3e and 3f, grey shaded area). The findings are strong and as
expected. Left-wing incumbents spend more on social welfare before elections and right-wing
incumbents increase expenditure on defense issues before elections in order to cater to their
specific constituency. Independent of partisanship governments increase pre-electoral welfare
spending in case the unemployment rate is high.
Table 4: Strategic Budgeteering and Closeness of Elections, Partisan Budgeteering
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Model 3a Model 3b Model 3c Model 3d Model 3e Model 3f
Relative
exp.
Total exp.
per item
Relative
exp.
Total exp.
per item
Relative
exp.
Total exp.
per item
Total gov. exp. 0.090*** 0.093*** 0.102***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010)
Preelection
longterm spending
-0.031** -6532.98** -0.020* -6033.321** -0.019* -6738.809**
(0.015) (2850.240) (0.013) (2952.013) (0.014) (2674.757)
Pre*long*Transp. 0.003* 280.040** 0.002* 346.340** 0.001 372.816***
(0.002) (125.950) (0.001) (140.816) (0.001) (129.299)
Pre*long*Margin
maj.
0.006 5810.986* 0.010 3907.761* 0.015 4695.976
(0.023) (4086.931) (0.023) (2221.841) (0.025) (3048.595)
Preelection
shortterm spending
0.039* 10098.556* 0.043 11205.359* 0.027* 3630.990*
(0.026) (7194.097) (0.036) (7522.284) (0.018) (2412.679)
Pre*short*Transp. -0.004* -636.766* -0.005* -729.984* -0.003* -502.394*
(0.003) (330.225) (0.003) (374.857) (0.001) (313.175)
Pre*short*Margin -0.017 -7487.568 -0.028 -8321.073 -0.004 -1.08e+04
(0.061) (10161.018) (0.063) (10429.683) (0.031) (9827.533)
Inflation 0.000 84.923** 0.000 214.210*
(0.000) (35.008) (0.001) (109.373)
Labor tax 0.001 8.118 0.000 -30.326
(0.000) (72.049) (0.001) (102.137)
Capital tax -0.000 85.560* -0.000 87.858*
(0.000) (52.075) (0.000) (54.160)
Consump. tax rev. 0.000 -0.388 -0.000 2.523*
(0.000) (1.008) (0.000) (1.785)
Checks & Balances 0.000 188.375
(0.001) (187.133)
GDP per capita 0.000 -0.302*
(0.000) (0.182)
Unemployment -0.002* -83.586
(0.001) (152.240)
Majoritarian 0.034 23124.490**
(0.031) (10130.891)
Margin of Majority 0.014 1383.456
(0.017) (2413.600)
Left cabinet portf. -0.000 -3.783
(0.000) (11.113)
Right cabinet portf. 0.000 -1.047
(0.000) (9.808)
Pre*unemp*SoSec 0.037*** 3554.101***
(0.002) (516.566)
Pre*Left*SoSec 0.002*** 199.355**
(0.000) (91.215)
Pre*Right*Def. 0.000*** 12.898*
(0.000) (9.051)
Intercept 0.073*** -1623.061* 0.062*** -5915.837* 0.030 -2.60e+04**
(0.005) (861.843) (0.016) (3041.554) (0.040) (10842.177)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
R² adj. 0.004 0.277 0.010 0.273 0.172 0.325
N 5742 5742 5391 5391 4916 4916
F 4.003 68.301 3.008 55.134 28.652 35.008
Robust White Standard Errors in Parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Conclusion
The literature on political business cycles in fiscal policies has come a long way. Most
importantly, scholars have highlighted different fiscal strategies which are used by
incumbents to increase the voters’ well-being before elections. Additionally, they have
investigated into the constraints governments face particularly when employing deficit
spending in the pre-election period. They thereby elucidate the conditions under which deficit
spending as a strategy to win re-election is effective.
Based on the insights of these models which analyze different strategies in isolation, this
paper developed an integrated formal model of fiscal strategies in the pre-election period.
Most importantly, we analyzed how opportunistic incumbents choose between different fiscal
strategies, such as deficit spending and strategic budgeteering, to increase their electoral
prospect in the period before the election takes place. One of our main departures from the
literature was that we assumed that governments may either spend on long-term efficient
investment or short-term efficient public good provision. They increase public good provision
in the pre-election period by either raising deficits or by redirecting resources from long-term
efficient investments to short-term efficient public goods.
We find that governments principally have an incentive to increase short-term public good
provisions if they fear fierce electoral competition and small chances of getting re-elected. To
finance these opportunistic policies, governments increase the deficit in the pre-election
period. Deficit spending becomes less attractive if fiscal transparency is high (and
consequently, fiscally conservative voters would be able to observe the distortive policies of
the government) and interest rates rise. The incumbent then faces a trade off between short-
term public good provision and long-term efficient investment. Because they cannot use
deficit spending under fiscal transparency, governments tend to change the composition of the
budget if elections are close. Strategic budgeteering goes at the expense of long-term efficient
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investments. In other words, long-term efficient fiscal policies are less likely the higher fiscal
transparency and the smaller the probability that the incumbent gets re-elected.
In a way of summarizing, the model presented here elucidates under which governments
either rely on deficit spending or the redistribution of budget resources – what we call
strategic budgeteering – in order to increase the voters’ welfare in the period before elections.
The model offers a parsimonious account of opportunistic governmental strategies. It thereby
provides the basis for several important extensions. First of all, governments do not only face
a trade off when choosing alternative fiscal policies. Under certain conditions – e.g. if
exchange rates are flexible or central bank independence low – monetary policy instruments
become effective leaving fiscal strategies ineffective. An important extension of our model
would thus include the possibility to use monetary policies to generate political business
cycles.
Additionally, we have neither considered partisan preferences nor different forms of strategic
budgeteering in our baseline model. However, we expect that different political parties would
serve different voters, and thus increase spending on different budget items or have different
preferences of raising the deficit. This is directly linked to different forms of re-distributing
the budget. While our baseline model simply assumes that governments choose between long-
term efficient investment and short-term efficient public goods, redistribution could take
several forms. In an extension to the baseline model, it would be thus important to distinguish
between, for example, (a) functional, (b) sectoral, and (c) regional budgeteering.
The empirical analysis supports most of our predictions, governments engage in strategic
budgeteering and they do so the more contested the elections are. However, fiscal
transparency seems to reduce all activities that aim at manipulating the electotral business
cycle. Moreover, we found some support for partisan budgeteering.
The empirical models however need to better take substitution effects as well as simultaneity
and endogeneity issues into account.
33
(Incomplete) References
Adolph, C, 2001: Parties, Unions, and Central Banks: an Interactive Model of Unemployment
in OECD Countries. Unpublished Working Paper.
Akhmedov, Akhmed and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004: Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test
in a Young Democracy Setting, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(4): 1301-
1338.
Alesina, Alberto (1987): Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game,
in: Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:651-678.
Alesina, Alberto (1988): Macroeconomics and Politics, in: O. Blanchard/S. Fischer (Hrsg.):
NBER Macroeconomics and Annual. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press.
Alesina, Alberto, 1989: Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Economies, in: Economic
Policy 5, 55-98.
Alesina, Alberto, Gerald D. Cohen and Nouriel Roubini, 1992: Macroeconomic Policy and
Elections in OECD Democracies, in: Economics and Politics 4: 1-30.
Alesina, Alaberto, Nouriel Roubini, and Gerald D. Cohen, 1997: Political Cycles and the
Macroeconomy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini, 1992: Political Cycles in OECD Economies, in:
Review of Economic Studies 59: 663-88.
Alesina, Alberto, Roberto Perotti and José Tavares, 1998: The Political Economy of Fiscal
Adjustments. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1998(1): 197-266.
Alt, James, 1985: Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and
International Sources of Economic Activity, in: American Political Science Review
79(4): 1016-1040.
Alt, James E. and David Dreyer Lassen, 2006a: Transparency, Political Polarization, and
Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries, in: American Journal of Political Science
50(3): 530-550.
Alt, James E. and David Dreyer Lassen, 2006b: Fiscal Transparency, Political Parties, and
Debt in OECD Countries, in: European Economic Review 50: 1403-1439.
Andrikopoulos, Andreas, Ioannis Loizides, and Kyprianos Prodromidis, 2004: Fiscal Policy
and Political Business Cycles in the EU, in: European Journal of Political Economy
20: 125-152.
Bawn, Kathleen, 1999: Money and Majorities in the Federal Republic of Germany: Evidence
for a Veto Players Model of Government Spending, in: American Journal of Political
Science, 707-736.
Bernard, William and David Leblang, 1999: Democratic Institutions and Exchange-Rate
Commitments, in: International Organization 53: 71-97.
Bernard, William and David Leblang, 2002: Democratic Processes and Political Risk:
Evidence from Foreign Exchange Markets, in: American Journal of Political Science
46(2): 316-333.
Bernhard, William T., Lawrence J. Broz and William R. Clark, 2002: The Political Economy
of Monetary Institutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Boix, Charles, 2000: Partisan Governments, the International Economy, and Macroeconomic
Policies in Advanced Nations, 1960-93, in: World Politics 53: 38-73.
Bräuninger, Thomas, 2005: Do Preferences Make a Difference? Parties and the Composition
of Budgets in Nineteen OECD Countries, in: Public Choice 125: 409-429.
Brender, Adi, 2003: The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election Results
in Israel: 1989-1998, in: Journal of Public Economics 87: 2187-2205.
Brender, Adi and Allan Drazen, 2005: Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established
Democracies, in: Journal of Monetary Economics 52: 1271-1295.
34
Buti, Mario and Paul van der Noord, 2003: Discretionary Fiscal Policy and Elections: The
Experience of the Early Years of EMU. OECD Economics Department Working
Paper No. 351.
Clark, William R., 2002a: Capitalism Not Globalism: Capital Mobility, and Political Control
of the Economy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Clark, William R., 2002b: Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary
Institutions under Fully Mobile Capital, in: International Organization 56: 725-749.
Clark, William R., Usha N. Reichert, Sandra L. Lomas and Kevin L. Parker, 1998:
International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in OECD
Economies, in: International Organization 52(1): 87-120.
Clark, William R. and Mark Hallerberg, 2000: Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and
Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy, in: American Political Science
Review 94: 323-346.
Cusack, Thomas R., 1997: Partisan Politics and Public Finance: Changes in Public Spending
in Industrialized Democracies, 1955-1989, in: Public Choice 91: 375-395.
De Haan, Jacob and Jan-Egbert Sturm, 1994: Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal
Policy in the European Community, in: Public Choice 80: 157-172.
Drazen, Allan, 2000a: Political Economy in Macroeconomics. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Drazen, Allan, 2000b: The Political Business Cycle after 25 Years, in: NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 15: 75-117.
Drazen, Allan and Marcela Eslava, 2005: Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure
Composition: Theory and Evidence, in: NBER Working Paper No. W11085.
Drazen, Allan and Marcela Eslava, 2005: Pork Barrel Cycles, in: NBER Working Paper No.
W12190.
Easterly, W, 1999: When is Fiscal Adjustment an Illusion?, in: Economic Policy 14: 57-76.
Ferejohn, John, 1999: Acountability and Authority: Towards a Model of Political
Accountability, in A. Przeworski, B. Manin, and SC Stokes (eds.): Democracy,
Accountability, and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Franzese, Robert J., 1999: Partially Independent Central Banks, Political Responsive
Governments, and Inflation, in: American Journal of Political Science 43: 681-706.
Franzese, Robert J., 2002a: Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Economic Policies and
Outcomes, in: Annual Review of Political Science 5: 369-421.
Franzese, Robert J., 2002b: Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Countries. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Franzese, Robert J., 2002c: The Positive Political Economy of Public Debt: An Empirical
Examination of the OECD Postwar Experience. Social Science Research Network
Working Paper Series.
Franzese, Robert J., 2003: Multiple Hands on the Wheel: Empirically Modeling Partial
Delegation and Shared Policy control in the Open and Institutionalized Economy, in:
Political Analysis 11(4): 445-474.
Frey, BS and F Schneider, 1978a: An Empirical Study of Politico-economic Interaction in the
United States, in: Review of Economic Statistics 60: 174-183.
Frey, BS and F Schneider, 1978b: A Politico-Economic Model of the United Kingdom, in:
Economic Journal 88: 243-253.
Golden, DG and JM Poterba, 1980: The Price of Popularity: the Political Business Cycle
Reexamined, in: American Journal of Political Science 24 (4): 696-714.
Goodhart, LM, 2000: Political Institutions, Elections, and Policy Choices. PhD thesis,
Harvard University, Cambridge, MA:
Hallerberg, Mark, Lucio Vinhas de Souza and William Clark, 2002: Political Business Cycles
in EU Accession Countries, in: European Union Politics 3(2): 231-250.
35
Hibbs, Douglas A., 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy, in: American Political
Science Review 23: 1467-1488.
Hibbs, Douglas A., 1987. The American Political Economy: Macroeconomics and Electoral
Politics in the United States. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
International Monetary Fund, 2003: Germany. Report on Observance of Standards and
Codes—Fiscal Transparency. IMF Country Report No. 03/286.
Jochimsen, Beate and Robert Nuscheler, 2005: The Political Economy of German Länder
Deficits. Unpublished working paper.
Kalecki M, 1943: Political Aspects of Full Employment, in: Political Quarterly 7: 322-331.
Koening, Thomas and Vera E. Troeger 2005:Budgetary Politics and Veto Players, in Swiss
Political Science Review 11(4): 47-75.
Leblang, David and William Bernard, 2000a: Political Parties and Monetary Commitments, in
William Bernard, J. Lawrence Broz and William R. Clark (eds.): The Political
Economy of Monetary Institutions. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Leblang, David and William Bernard, 2000b: The Politics of Speculative Attacks in Industrial
Democracies, in: International Organization 54: 291-324.
Lohmann, Susanne, 1998: Rationalizing the Political Business Cycle: a Workhorse Model.
Economic Politics 10: 1-17.
Midtbo, Tor, 1998: The Open Politiconomy: A Dynamic Analysis of Social Democratic
Popularity and Economic Policies in Scandinavia, in: British Journal of Political
Science 28(1): 93-112.
Milesi-Feretti, GM, 2004: Good, Bad or Ugly? On the Effects of Fiscal Rules with Creative
Accounting, in: Journal of Public Economics 88: 377-394.
Mink, Mark and Jakob de Haan, 2005: Has the Stability and Growth Pact Impeded Political
Budget Cycles in the European Union? CESIFO Working Paper No. 1532.
Nordhaus, William D., 1975: The Political Business Cycle, in: Review of Economic Studies
42: 169-190.
Oatley, Thomas H., 1999: Monetary Politics. Exchange-Rate Cooperation in the European
Union. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Peltzman, Sam, 1992: Voters as Fiscal Conservatives, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics
107: 327-261.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 1990: Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility and Politics.
London: Harwood.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2002: Political Economics. Explaining Economic
Policy. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2003a: The Economic Effects of Constitutions.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, 2003b: Do Electoral Cycles Differ Across Political
Systems? IGIER Working Paper No. 232.
Phillips, Alban W. 1958. The relation between unemployment and the rate of change of
money: wage rates in the United Kingdom, 1861-1957. Economica 25 (100):283-299.
Price, Simon, 1998: Comment on “The Politics of the Political Business Cycle.”, in: British
Journal of Political Science 28: 201-210.
Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990: Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles, in: American Economic Review
80: 21-36.
Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Sibert, 1988: Election and Macroeconomic Cycles, in: Review of
Economic Studies 55: 1-16.
Romer, David. 2001. Advanced Macroeconomics (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Rose, Shanna, 2006: Do Fiscal Rules Dampen the Political Business Cycle?, in: Public
Choice 128: 407–431.
36
Schneider, Christina J., 2007: Politischer Opportunismus und Haushaltsdefizite in den
westdeutschen Bundesländern, in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 48(2): 221-242.
Schneider, Christina, J., 2008: Fighting with One Hand Tied Behind the Back, or: Can
Incumbents Use Fiscal Policies for Electoral Gain? Manuscript. Department of Politics
and International Relations, University of Oxford.
Schultz, Kenneth A., 1995: The Politics of the Political Business Cycle, in: British Journal of
Political Science 25(1): 79-99.
Schumpeter, J, 1939: Business Cycles: A Theoretical, Historical, and Statistical Analysis of
the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Shi, Min and Jakob Svensson, 2000: Political Business Cycles in Developed and Developing
Countries. World Bank Working Paper.
Shi, Min and Jakob Svensson, 2002: Conditional Political Budget Cycles. Manuscript, IIES,
Stockholm.
Shi, Min and Jakob Svensson, 2006: Political Business Cycles: Do they Differ Across
Countries and Why?, in: Journal of Public Economics 90(8-9): 1367-1389.
Tufte, Edward R., 1978: Political Control of the Economy. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Von Hagen, Jürgen, 2003: Fiscal Discipline and Growth in Euroland. Experiences with the
Stability and Growth Pact. ZEI Working Paper No. B062003.
Wright, Gavin, 1974: The Political Economy of New Deal Spending: an Econometric
Analysis, in: Review of Economic Statistics 56: 30-38.
